China's Support Reshapes Myanmar's War and Military Election

Border Pressure and Weapons Help the Military Regain Ground

China's pressure on armed groups, weapons transfers and diplomatic support have helped Myanmar's military regain some territory and advance an election widely condemned by monitors and United Nations experts. Nearly five years after the February 2021 coup that removed Aung San Suu Kyi's elected government, the generals have recovered some momentum against a patchwork of opposition forces, although fighting continues across much of the country.

Beijing has used border closures to push powerful ethnic armed groups in northern Myanmar toward ceasefires and the return of territory. At the same time, it has continued supplying weapons and strengthened the military leadership's international standing. These actions connect China's influence over local economies with its ability to affect the battlefield.

Jason Tower, a senior expert at the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime who focuses on Myanmar, attributes much of the shift to Beijing.

This is really all China playing a role in tilting things in favor of the military regime,

China's interests extend from its border to the Indian Ocean. Infrastructure investments worth billions of dollars, disrupted trade and criminal compounds targeting Chinese citizens all shape its decisions. Beijing publicly follows a policy of noninterference, yet its actions show how strongly it can influence political and military outcomes in a strategically important neighbour.

Myanmar's military has retaken strategically important towns, including Kyaukme and Hsipaw, on the main trade route connecting the Chinese border with the rest of Myanmar. Ethnic armed groups had captured these areas during the conflict that expanded with their 2023 offensive. The military still lacks control over vast areas, and its forces remain stretched across several fronts.

Why Beijing Supports the Election

China, a state governed by one party without competitive democratic elections at home, has backed Myanmar's vote, scheduled to begin on Sunday. Beijing sees a managed political process as a way to restore more predictable government and protect its interests.

Earlier in 2025, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi expressed hope that the election would bring peace and governance reflecting popular wishes. His stated aims included national reconciliation.

domestic peace with a cessation of hostilities among parties and national governance based on the will of the people,

Wang also called for:

social harmony.

China will send election observers, alongside countries including Russia and Vietnam. Their presence gives the process international visibility and a measure of legitimacy, while monitors and UN experts have condemned it as a sham.

The military's proxy, the Union Solidarity and Development party, dominates the proceedings. The National League for Democracy, which won the last free election in 2020, has been forcibly dissolved. Many genuine opposition parties have been barred from participating or have chosen to boycott.

Richard Horsey, senior adviser on Myanmar at the International Crisis Group, explains Beijing's preference for replacing emergency government with a familiar constitutional framework.

China supports the election because it would like to see a return to more predictable rule in Myanmar under the 2008 constitution, rather than the current emergency rule,

Beijing appears to regard gradual reform as a more workable route to stability than a complete revolution. Its support for an election without genuine opposition participation reflects that calculation.

Billions in Infrastructure Are at Stake

China's primary interest in Myanmar remains economic. As the country's biggest investor, it has committed billions of dollars to infrastructure, including the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor, or CMEC. Established in 2018 under the Belt and Road Initiative, the corridor is intended to connect southwestern China with the Indian Ocean through highways, railways, pipelines and ports.

Kyaukphyu in Rakhine State is central to these plans. Chinese investments there include a major deep seaport and oil and gas pipelines connecting the area with Kunming in Yunnan province. This route offers an alternative for energy shipments that would otherwise pass through the potentially vulnerable Strait of Malacca.

Fighting since the coup has disrupted the corridor and threatened Chinese investments. The Arakan Army has seized several major cities in Rakhine State, placing projects there at risk. Beijing's intervention reflects its concern that further military losses could leave important investments exposed.

China initially declined to back the regime that seized power in February 2021. Beijing regarded the coup as damaging to its strategic interests and investments. It was also unhappy with commander-in-chief Min Aung Hlaing, whom it viewed as incompetent, insufficiently cooperative over scam compounds and inclined toward hostility to China.

China's own economic slowdown in the years following COVID-19 has affected neighbouring countries and projects under the Belt and Road Initiative. As Beijing concentrates on domestic economic difficulties, international affairs have become less of a priority. Myanmar remains largely a concern for Yunnan's provincial government, provided United States involvement stays limited.

Aircraft and Drones Change the Military's Options

China has increased military support through advanced weapons and newer drone technologies. These systems allow the military to strike opposition forces more precisely while exposing fewer of its own troops to danger.

Tower links the weapons and pressure on ethnic armed organisations to the military's improved position in northern Myanmar.

The newer drone technologies that's related to China, the pressure on ethnic armed organisations, reducing the amount of resistance that the junta was facing in the northern part of the country, that's on China,

Analysis by the Stimson Center puts Chinese deliveries since August 2024 at six fighter jets, alongside other military equipment. Myanmar's air force has received FTC-2000G trainer jets, which are lighter and cheaper to operate than more advanced aircraft. They are sufficient for attacks against mainly civilian targets or opponents without missiles capable of shooting aircraft down from the ground.

The air force has also received more drones made in China, including reconnaissance models used to observe positions and armed versions capable of carrying payloads. China has helped the military gain access to international platforms such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Summit, strengthening its diplomatic standing alongside its military capacity.

These gains have allowed the regime to recover some ground, but civil war continues across much of Myanmar. Its limited counteroffensives sit alongside continuing territorial losses to opponents, particularly some of the larger ethnic armed groups.

Resistance Drone Programs Face Rising Costs

Opposition forces initially gained an advantage by adapting inexpensive commercial drones for combat. During Operation 1027, they dropped 25,000 munitions by drone, overwhelming remote military outposts. Unmanned aerial vehicles, or UAVs, became a way to attack positions without sending fighters directly toward them.

The military responded by importing, producing and deploying smaller quadcopters and hexacopters, drones with four or six rotors that can drop munitions. It has also used kamikaze drones made in Russia and China, which strike their targets directly.

Local People's Defense Force commanders describe the frequency of military drone operations as:

day and night.

By late 2024, opposition forces were acknowledging how widely the military had adopted the technology.

the military junta has extensively used drones in almost all their battles.

Resistance forces have almost no countermeasures or jamming devices, which interfere with the signals drones need to operate. This shortage allows the military to use some of its most accurate weapons against them.

China has introduced export controls on items with both civilian and military uses, blocking drone components from reaching opposition groups. Resistance leaders in Southern Shan and Karenni states report rising procurement costs that are already affecting their ability to sustain drone programs.

Opposition contacts also describe a crackdown in Thailand on purchases of drones and parts for Myanmar's resistance. Armed groups are trying to overcome the military's countermeasures, while Beijing's restrictions show its intent to weaken a capability that had served the opposition effectively.

Border Closures Push Armed Groups Toward Ceasefires

China's pressure on ethnic armed organisations has included electricity and internet cuts and the closure of border trade. These measures have devastated local economies and pushed groups dependent on access to China to halt offensives or surrender territory.

The Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, or MNDAA, finalised a ceasefire with the military in Kunming on January 20, 2025. It pledged to return Lashio to military control by the middle of 2025. Lashio, the capital of northern Shan State and its most important economic hub, became the clearest example of Beijing's intervention.

The agreement followed allegations that China had detained MNDAA commander Peng Deren to compel peace talks. Beijing also encouraged the United Wa State Army, or UWSA, to move west from its enclave along the Chinese border to stop the MNDAA and the Ta'ang National Liberation Army, or TNLA, advancing south into Central Shan State.

China demanded that the Wa stop selling arms and ammunition to opposition forces. It also pressured the Kachin Independence Army, or KIA, which controls about 13 of Kachin State's 18 townships, to stop its offensive.

After the January ceasefire between the MNDAA and the State Administration Council, the military's governing body, China reopened three main border gates. It maintained blockades at three others controlled by the TNLA and MNDAA.

The main dates show how the military crisis and China's response developed:

• 2018: The China-Myanmar Economic Corridor was established under the Belt and Road Initiative.
• 2020: The National League for Democracy won Myanmar's last free election.
• February 2021: The military removed Aung San Suu Kyi's elected government.
• April 2021: ASEAN proposed its Five-Point Consensus on Myanmar.
• Late 2023: Operation 1027 brought major opposition advances and attacks on scam compounds.
• May 2024: Internet and telephone connections to Shwe Kokko were terminated from Thailand's side.
• August 2024 onward: Chinese deliveries included six fighter jets and other military equipment, according to Stimson Center analysis.
• January 20, 2025: The MNDAA finalised its ceasefire in Kunming, pledging to return Lashio by the middle of 2025.

Scam Compounds Help Explain China's Shift

China's frustration with organised crime has strongly influenced its policy. Criminal networks led by Chinese operators established compounds in Myanmar and trafficked Chinese citizens into online fraud operations.

In 2023, an estimated 120,000 people were working in these operations. Estimated annual revenue reached $15.3 billion, roughly a quarter of Myanmar's gross domestic product, the value of goods and services produced in the country.

The military's unwillingness to launch major operations against the compounds created an opening for the resistance. China gave tacit approval to Operation 1027 in late 2023, and the Three Brotherhood Alliance identified eliminating cyber scam centres as a major reason for its offensive.

The offensive forced compounds to relocate within Myanmar and elsewhere in the region, particularly toward Shwe Kokko on the border with Thailand. Since the coup, scam businesses had expanded as the military looked the other way to keep allied militias on its side. They became major sources of income for various armed groups.

Beijing maintained pressure on Myanmar's military and Thailand to eradicate the operations. Internet and telephone communications to Shwe Kokko were terminated from Thailand's side in May 2024. More recently, the military has undertaken action against scam operations, including bombing parts of the infamous KK Park compound over recent months.

The military has promised China that economic projects will proceed and scam compounds will be tackled. Its ability to fulfil those promises remains uncertain. Continued territorial losses and the need for money on all sides create conditions in which armed actors may allow more criminal compounds to operate for profit.

Horsey describes the persistent spread of telecommunications fraud across borders as:

a stubborn cancer of international crime

Beijing Maintains Relationships on Both Sides

China is the military's primary supporter in military, economic and diplomatic terms, while maintaining relationships with ethnic armed groups fighting it. Those connections give Beijing influence across competing centres of power and help protect its interests regardless of who controls particular territory.

Beijing's preference for dealing with state institutions keeps senior contacts with the regime active despite its limited territorial reach. The military still controls international airports, seaports and important economic areas, including Yangon, the commercial capital where most foreign embassies are located.

The resistance holds areas that were economically less important before the coup, alongside formerly prosperous routes for trade with China. Those border routes have seen little activity since Operation 1027. Attempts to reopen them fully have failed despite Beijing's desire to restore commerce.

Chinese special envoys have conducted private diplomacy through different groups. Those contacts fall short of overt support for the opposition. Beijing has separately invited former Myanmar President U Thein Sein, State Administration Council deputy leader Soe Win and political parties participating in the election.

China has also appeared cautious about Min Aung Hlaing's growing ties with Moscow. Its engagement with multiple actors reflects an effort to manage competing interests rather than rely entirely on one leader.

ASEAN Struggles as China's Influence Grows

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or ASEAN, proposed its Five-Point Consensus in April 2021. More than four years later, that peace framework remains largely on paper, with regional efforts stalled and little effective pressure on the generals.

China's closer relationship with Myanmar's military has made ASEAN's limited influence more apparent. Beijing's support for an election without broad participation could strengthen the regime's claim to legitimacy while weakening the regional organisation's standing and ability to address problems within its membership.

David Mathieson, an independent analyst who follows Myanmar closely, describes the contrast between China's activity and ASEAN's record.

ASEAN cannot react with umbrage if China is making more 'progress' than the regional body, their regional efforts have been fruitless,

China's economic relationships with most ASEAN countries give it political influence. Because regional governments generally balance their relationships with China and the United States, Beijing believes it can take more exploratory political steps in Myanmar without damaging those ties.

ASEAN wants to advance peace but lacks effective channels for direct communication with the military. China has frequent contact and longstanding familiarity with the generals, while also communicating with some forces opposing them and exercising substantial influence over ethnic armed groups.

A Smaller American Role Leaves Beijing More Space

The United States supported voter education and civil society during Myanmar's 2015 general election. Washington later downgraded diplomatic ties following the coup, and its reduced presence has given China more room to expand its influence without substantial resistance.

Five years ago, American programs sought to strengthen democracy internationally and counter Chinese influence in the region. Those efforts have since been sharply reduced, leaving China as the main outside actor with meaningful influence over Myanmar's direction.

The Trump administration has shown little interest in Myanmar beyond tariffs. A tariff letter addressed to Min Aung Hlaing as regime leader amounted to Washington's first public recognition of the regime. He responded at length, asking for an end to American sanctions and offering to send a senior delegation to Washington for tariff negotiations.

The dismantling of USAID and cuts to democracy promotion have been welcomed in Naypyitaw. They have encouraged the regime's belief that Washington is no longer resisting it or obstructing its relations with neighbouring countries.

The National Unity Government and other democratic forces have lost financial support and a source of reassurance that a powerful international supporter stood behind their struggle. This retreat adds to the imbalance created by China's weapons, border pressure and diplomatic backing.

Burned Homes and Conscription Shape Civilian Lives

Myanmar's humanitarian conditions continue to worsen amid war, economic collapse and natural disasters. Estimates put the number of houses burned by the military in the dry zone alone at 110,000 to 120,000. The violence has touched much of the population.

The military has responded to battlefield setbacks with forced conscription. Thousands of young Burmese men have fled abroad, hidden or joined the resistance. More than 60,000 have entered the army, replenishing exhausted ranks. Insurgent sources say these recruits, although inexperienced, have made a difference.

Mu Mu, a pseudonym for a man in his early twenties, hid in a hole beneath a wooden house when soldiers entered his village to seize men able to serve. His legs trembled uncontrollably as he waited.

His family later shaved his head and prepared monastic robes to help him escape. He bribed officers at checkpoints and reached Yangon. About 35 people from his village were taken away by the military.

Such experiences show the distance between political plans and daily life. Military recruitment may restore manpower, while families face decisions about hiding, escape or joining armed resistance.

Military Gains Leave Peace Distant

China's backing and the military's territorial recoveries have not resolved Myanmar's political crisis. The planned election is unlikely to reduce the intensity of fighting. It is more likely to harden divisions and bring further violence as the regime tries to secure voting areas and resistance forces fight back.

Morgan Michaels, research fellow for southeast Asian security at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, describes the depth of the grievances created by the military's violence.

The violence has been immense, and there are few people who have not been touched by it,

Michaels explains why a ceasefire forced by military weakness offers a limited opening for a political settlement.

That's why it is difficult to foresee a political process right now. Being forced into ceasefire because you literally cannot hold your front lines is one thing, but political bargaining for peace still seems very distant.

The suffering inflicted on Myanmar's people has left grievances against the generals that may last generations. China could change course again if the military wastes opportunities for ceasefires or if infrastructure projects still show no progress two years from now.

For now, Beijing appears to have decided that supporting the military's election plans best serves its goals: stability, security along its border and protection of economic investments. Its support remains tied to what the regime can deliver.

Hostility toward China has grown in Myanmar, including a perception that Beijing is encouraging conflict to increase its influence. Yun Sun, senior fellow and director of the China programme at the Stimson Center, disputes that view.

China doesn't need a war to exert influence over any of the political players in the country,

Yun describes the reasoning she believes informs Beijing's approach.

I think what the Chinese will say is that they see the situation as a dynamism, that a balance of power will eventually lead to some stability.

China's ability to move that balance is visible in returned territory, restricted trade and changing access to weapons. Myanmar's continuing war shows how much separates those shifts from a political agreement accepted by the competing sides.

Key Points

• China's weapons, diplomatic support and pressure on ethnic armed groups have helped Myanmar's military regain some ground.
• The military dominates the election, while the National League for Democracy has been dissolved and genuine opposition participation is absent.
• Beijing seeks to protect infrastructure investments worth billions of dollars and curb scam compounds targeting Chinese citizens.
• The January 20, 2025 ceasefire included an MNDAA pledge to return Lashio to military control by the middle of 2025.
• Chinese export restrictions and purchasing difficulties in Thailand are increasing costs for resistance drone programs.
• ASEAN's peace framework remains stalled, while reduced American engagement gives China more political space.
• An estimated 110,000 to 120,000 homes have been burned in the dry zone, and more than 60,000 recruits have replenished the army.
• China maintains ties with the military and ethnic armed groups, and may adjust its support according to progress on security and economic projects.