Military Ties Put an Old Connection Back in Focus
Turkey's relationship with Pakistan drew renewed attention in 2025 through two developments: reports of Turkish military assistance during the India-Pakistan clashes in May, and an allegation by Indian investigators in November that a Turkish handler helped coordinate a blast at Delhi's historic Red Fort.
Contents
- Military Ties Put an Old Connection Back in Focus
- How Ottoman Interests Reached the Indian Ocean
- Babur, Gunpowder and the Mughal Connection
- From the Khilafat Movement to Hyderabad
- The Three Brothers and the May 2025 Crisis
- Defense Cooperation Moves Beyond Buying Weapons
- Why Ankara and Islamabad Want Closer Ties
- Bangladesh Adds Another Regional Dimension
- Kashmir, Armenia and Greece Complicate India's Relations
- Trade, Offshore Gas and Qatar's Financial Role
- Economic Pressures and Different Security Priorities
- Key Points
The allegation concerning the blast remained an investigative claim. During the earlier military crisis, Turkey denied transferring weapons to Pakistan, although global aircraft tracking systems detected a Turkish C-130 military aircraft arriving there. The aircraft's presence became part of the controversy surrounding Ankara's support for Islamabad.
By December 28, 2025, Turkey's engagement with South Asia extended across defense production, intelligence cooperation, trade, energy and diplomacy. Pakistan was its closest regional partner, while Bangladesh's changing foreign relationships and India's ties with Armenia and Greece added other dimensions to the picture.
President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's approach is often described as neo-Ottoman: an effort to expand modern Turkey's influence, especially across the Islamic world, by drawing on connections associated with the former Ottoman Empire. In South Asia, those connections reach back more than five centuries and include military cooperation with Babur, the founder of the Mughal Empire, and the later attachment of Indian Muslims to the Ottoman caliph.
History helps explain the relationship's emotional appeal. Modern interests explain its practical shape. Pakistan gains access to Turkish weapons, technology and diplomatic backing, while Turkey gains a market for its defense industry and a partner connecting its ambitions in Central and South Asia.
How Ottoman Interests Reached the Indian Ocean
India's connections with the territory that became modern Turkey predated the Ottomans. Trade linked India with the Roman and Byzantine empires, whose capital, Constantinople, later became Istanbul. Those ties faded after Arab conquests changed the Middle East, then returned in another form as Turkic groups took control of Anatolia and established the Ottoman Empire.
By the early 16th century, Ottoman expansion across much of the Middle East had brought the empire to the Indian Ocean coastline. Its rulers faced two powerful rivals: the Shi'a Safavid Empire in Iran and Portugal, which was building coastal strongholds from East Africa to India and Southeast Asia to control maritime trade.
The Ottoman sultan claimed the title of caliph after conquering Egypt. A caliph claimed leadership of the wider Muslim community, giving the sultan a form of religious authority that could reach beyond his own territories. Ottoman influence was projected toward Central Africa, Central Asia and Indonesia.
Religious standing did not remove the need for practical alliances. Faced with threats from Persia, Russia, Portugal and the Habsburgs, the Ottomans developed relationships with partners as different as France, the Uzbek Khanate of Bukhara, Aceh in present-day Indonesia and several Indian kingdoms. Their engagement with South Asia belonged to this wider effort to find allies against competing powers.
Babur, Gunpowder and the Mughal Connection
Ottoman military assistance played an important role in Babur's rise from ruler of Kabul to founder of Mughal rule in India. Sultan Selim I sent commanders, soldiers, cannons and matchlocks to support him at a time when gunpowder weapons were not widely used in the subcontinent.
Cannons provided artillery fire, while matchlocks were early firearms. Access to these weapons and the people who knew how to use them helped change the way wars were fought in India. Ottoman assistance connected the empire's military capabilities with Babur's ambitions in South Asia.
Mughal-Ottoman relations later moved between cooperation and rivalry. Both empires had ambitions beyond their borders, and their competing claims to religious authority complicated their relationship. Shared connections did not always produce shared political interests.
Rulers of Turkic origin established several major Muslim states in India, including the Delhi Sultanate and the Mughal Empire. That history forms part of the longer connection between South Asia and the Turkic world, alongside the more specific diplomatic and military relationships involving the Ottomans.
As Mughal power declined in the 18th century, Istanbul gained renewed importance for smaller Muslim states in India. The Ottomans remained the only major Muslim empire to avoid European colonisation and continued to claim the caliphate. Mysore was among the states that looked to the Ottoman capital for legitimacy and protection.
From the Khilafat Movement to Hyderabad
Under British rule, the Ottoman sultan retained symbolic importance for Indian Muslims. That attachment became a political movement between 1919 and 1922, when the Khilafat Movement sought to defend the Ottoman caliph and oppose British plans to dismantle the empire.
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk's abolition of the caliphate did not immediately end efforts to preserve or revive the institution. In the princely state of Hyderabad, the Nizam explored the possibility of restoring it on Indian soil. His sons married Ottoman princesses, linking the ruling family with the former imperial dynasty.
Historian Sam Dalrymple describes a further step taken by the Nizam in 1931:
secured a deed from the last Caliph, nominating their grandchildren as the next Caliphs of Islam.
Hyderabad's integration into India in 1948 ended those ambitions. The episode illustrates how Ottoman religious authority continued to attract interest in South Asia even after the empire and its caliphate had disappeared.
Erdogan's modern outlook draws on a sense of historical loss associated with the collapse of both the Ottoman and Mughal empires. That outlook has helped strengthen Turkey's relationship with Pakistan, which sees itself as inheriting the Mughal legacy. The contemporary partnership, however, also rests on concrete military and economic projects.
The Three Brothers and the May 2025 Crisis
Pakistan, Turkey and Azerbaijan form an informal defense grouping known as the "three brothers." Their cooperation has become increasingly visible through joint military exercises, agreements to produce defense equipment together and growing intelligence ties.
The May 2025 clashes between India and Pakistan followed a terrorist attack in Pahalgam that killed 26 Hindu tourists. Turkey quickly took a position supportive of Pakistan, placing its relationship with Islamabad at the center of another confrontation involving Kashmir.
Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif thanked Turkey for its "unwavering support" for Kashmir. Reports during the crisis described Turkish deliveries of military equipment and intelligence assistance to Pakistan. Ankara denied weapons transfers, while the tracked arrival of its C-130 aircraft kept attention on the extent of its involvement.
Erdogan also discussed the importance of intelligence sharing to combat terrorism during talks with Sharif. Cooperation between Turkey's intelligence agency, MIT, and Pakistan's ISI includes professional information exchange, while a substantial part of their military and intelligence relationship remains undisclosed.
The main developments described across this longer relationship can be placed in a short timeline:
- Early 16th century: Ottoman expansion reached the Indian Ocean, and Selim I provided military support to Babur.
- 1919-1922: The Khilafat Movement mobilized in India to defend the Ottoman caliph.
- 1931: The Nizam of Hyderabad obtained the deed described by Sam Dalrymple.
- 1948: Hyderabad's integration into India ended its ambitions to revive the caliphate.
- 2023: The Pakistan-Turkey Free Trade Agreement entered into force.
- May 2025: Turkey supported Pakistan during its clashes with India.
- August 2025: Pakistan and Bangladesh signed six agreements during Ishaq Dar's visit to Dhaka.
- November 2025: Indian investigators alleged a Turkish handler's involvement in the Red Fort blast.
Defense Cooperation Moves Beyond Buying Weapons
Turkey and Pakistan have developed a defense relationship that extends beyond purchasing finished equipment. Joint production and technology transfer give Pakistan a role in manufacturing, while giving Turkey opportunities to sell its systems and expand industrial partnerships.
The PN MILGEM warship program is a central example. The partnership also includes Turkish military experts helping Pakistan improve its armed forces and agreements involving drone warfare capabilities.
Major projects and areas of interest include:
- MILGEM corvettes: Four ships jointly produced under a deal worth $1.5 billion.
- T129 ATAK helicopters: Pakistan ordered 30 aircraft.
- JF-17 aircraft cooperation: Turkey has shown interest in aerospace collaboration.
- Drone capabilities: Technology transfer agreements form part of the developing defense relationship.
Turkey's defense exports increased by 106 percent between 2013 and 2023, with the export figure exceeding $7 billion in 2023. The percentage represents more than a doubling over that period. Indigenous systems such as the Bayraktar drone helped drive that growth, gaining prominence in conflicts in Libya, Nagorno-Karabakh and Ukraine.
India's concern centers on what greater Pakistani access to Turkish technology could mean for its conventional military advantage. A potential transfer of sophisticated TB2 drone technology would improve Pakistan's ability to gather intelligence, watch activity and conduct reconnaissance along the contested Line of Control in Kashmir. These functions help armed forces understand where an opponent is operating and what it may be preparing to do.
Why Ankara and Islamabad Want Closer Ties
Turkey's interest in South Asia combines prestige with strategy. Connections to the subcontinent's large Muslim population and Muslim states strengthen its standing in the Islamic world. In Pakistan, Turkish television, culture and political narratives have gained popularity, and many people view Turkey as a model worth following.
Pakistan also gives Turkey a partner through which it can display defense products, extend its reach into Central and South Asia, compete with Arab influence and keep pressure on Iran, a longstanding rival. Ankara's interests are broader than its disagreements with New Delhi.
Pakistan, meanwhile, sees Turkey as a dependable partner as Saudi Arabia and Iran pursue warmer ties with India for economic and political reasons. Turkish support provides Islamabad with another diplomatic relationship alongside its other major partnerships.
The United States' closer strategic relationship with India is another part of the calculation. Ankara and Islamabad perceive that alignment as a form of strategic encirclement and seek to offset it through closer military coordination and economic integration.
Turkey's own foreign policy has changed as relations with the European Union and the United States have suffered setbacks. It has moved from the role of a traditional Western ally toward greater strategic autonomy, meaning a stronger effort to make decisions according to its own priorities while maintaining existing relationships.
Its geography supports that approach. Turkey sits at an eastern gateway into Europe and a western gateway into Asia. That position has helped it pursue a more assertive role as Western powers confront serious challenges. Its defense partnership model also provides a reference for India as New Delhi develops domestic weapons production, maintains strategic autonomy and deepens ties with the United States and other Western partners.
Bangladesh Adds Another Regional Dimension
Bangladesh's changing relationships have widened the South Asian setting for Turkey's engagement. Following the fall of Sheikh Hasina's government in July 2024, Dhaka increasingly viewed India as an adversary while moving closer to Pakistan, the country from which India helped it gain independence in 1971.
In August 2025, Pakistan and Bangladesh signed an agreement allowing visa-free travel for holders of diplomatic and government passports. It was one of six agreements concluded during a visit to Dhaka by Pakistan's Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Muhammad Ishaq Dar, the first visit at that level in 13 years.
Professor Muhammad Yunus, Chief Adviser to Bangladesh's interim government, described his government's foreign policy approach in broad terms:
reaching out to everybody
Yunus sought to reduce dependence on Indian trade and build closer relationships with Beijing and other regional partners, including Pakistan and Turkey. The direction marked a break from the orientation toward India associated with Hasina.
Reports also described Bangladeshi inquiries about purchasing Chinese J10 and JF17 fighter aircraft, the same types Pakistan's air force deployed during the May clashes with India. Yunus condemned April's terrorist attacks in Kashmir, while the prospect of another neighboring country acquiring advanced military equipment added to India's security concerns.
Kashmir, Armenia and Greece Complicate India's Relations
India and Turkey maintain an uneasy relationship, with modest bilateral trade and disagreements reaching beyond South Asia. Turkey's support for Pakistan on Kashmir is one source of friction. India's increasingly warm relations with Greece and Armenia are others.
The rivalry between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh places Ankara and New Delhi on opposing sides. Turkey strongly supports Azerbaijan and supplied Baku with close to $106 million worth of weapons in 2023. India has developed close ties with Armenia and emerged as its largest defense supplier.
Those relationships connect the South Caucasus with South Asian security calculations. Pakistan's cooperation with Turkey and Azerbaijan sits alongside India's defense relationship with Armenia, creating overlapping partnerships across regions that are geographically distant.
Turkey's growing defense industry is central to this wider reach. Weapons sales, joint manufacturing and training allow Ankara to turn diplomatic relationships into continuing practical cooperation. For India, responding involves both managing disagreements with Turkey and developing its own industrial and international partnerships.
Trade, Offshore Gas and Qatar's Financial Role
The Pakistan-Turkey Free Trade Agreement entered into force in 2023, regulating trade, investment and economic cooperation. The two countries aim to raise bilateral trade to $5 billion by 2027. Their strategic economic relationship rests on shared geopolitical interests, established ties and expanding trade and investment links.
Energy cooperation could provide another route for deeper engagement. Turkey's potential participation in extracting and marketing gas reserves in Pakistani territorial waters would offer Pakistan a way to earn revenue from offshore resources that have remained largely untapped.
For Turkey, involvement would fit its ambition to become an energy hub linking Asian resources with European markets. An energy hub connects production, transport and buyers, allowing a country to play a larger role in how fuel reaches consumers.
The stalled Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline gives this possibility a regional dimension. Pakistan's turn toward Turkish energy cooperation suggests a change in its economic relationships that could come at Iran's expense.
Qatar also connects the two countries through energy and financial support. As a major producer of liquefied natural gas, or LNG, Qatar has considerable influence in energy markets. LNG is gas cooled into liquid form so it can be transported by ship.
During Pakistan's balance of payments difficulties in 2018-2019, Qatar provided a $3 billion package of deposits and direct investment. A balance of payments problem occurs when a country struggles to obtain enough foreign currency to cover payments abroad. In 2018, Doha also announced $15 billion in direct investment in Turkey as Ankara faced a current account deficit, a gap between its international income and spending.
Economic Pressures and Different Security Priorities
Pakistan's continuing dependence on support from the International Monetary Fund limits the resources available for ambitious projects and constrains its diplomatic flexibility. Turkey faces its own currency volatility and inflation pressures. Both countries must balance strategic ambitions with difficult economic conditions.
Those vulnerabilities also give Western powers points of influence as they seek to moderate the partnership's potentially disruptive effects. Financial needs can affect the choices governments make about spending and international cooperation.
Turkey's NATO membership places limits on its strategic freedom, especially in defense cooperation with partners outside the alliance. Pakistan must also manage the competing demands of its complex relationships with China and the United States.
The two countries do not have identical security priorities. Turkey concentrates heavily on the Eastern Mediterranean, Syria and the Kurdish question. Pakistan remains primarily focused on India and Afghanistan. Shared interests can support cooperation while these different priorities shape how much attention and money each government can commit.
Energy and defense production remain potential areas for further development. Cooperation could expand from naval platforms into aerospace, missile technology and electronic warfare, which involves using or disrupting electronic signals for military purposes. The stated trade target provides a concrete horizon of 2027, while these broader industrial possibilities depend on resources and agreements.
Key Points
- Turkey's South Asian connections stretch back more than five centuries and include Ottoman military assistance to Babur.
- The Khilafat Movement and Hyderabad's later ambitions show the Ottoman caliphate's lasting symbolic appeal in India.
- Pakistan, Turkey and Azerbaijan cooperate through the informal three brothers grouping.
- Turkey backed Pakistan during the May 2025 clashes with India and denied reported weapons transfers.
- Indian investigators alleged in November that a Turkish handler helped coordinate the Red Fort blast.
- Defense projects include four MILGEM corvettes under a $1.5 billion deal and Pakistan's order for 30 T129 ATAK helicopters.
- Pakistan and Turkey aim for $5 billion in bilateral trade by 2027, with energy cooperation another possible growth area.
- Bangladesh's closer ties with Pakistan, China and Turkey add to India's regional concerns.
- Economic pressures, alliance commitments and different security priorities constrain the Turkish-Pakistani partnership.






