Myanmar Announces 109 Trillion Cubic Feet of Offshore Gas as Sanctions Target Military Revenue

Four Gas Fields Put Military Revenue Under Scrutiny

Myanmar's military administration has announced four offshore gas discoveries containing an estimated 109 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, presenting a vast potential source of foreign currency as sanctions tighten around its energy industry. The Ministry of Information said the largest deposit, in the Tanintharyi deep sea zone, holds approximately 95 trillion cubic feet at 90 percent probability. Discoveries in the Ayeyarwady region account for up to 14 trillion cubic feet at 100 percent probability.

The ministry made the announcement on a Monday without naming the specific blocks. Its figures describe estimates of gas underground. Turning that gas into income requires extraction, processing, transport and buyers, all involving companies and financial arrangements now exposed to international restrictions.

Natural gas has historically supplied roughly half of Myanmar's foreign currency earnings and has been the government's largest revenue source. For a military administration facing a collapsing kyat, armed resistance across large parts of the country and some of Asia's most severe international sanctions in recent years, the attraction is straightforward: gas exports bring in foreign money needed to pay for imports.

The military says new development will support electricity generation, fertilizer production and industrial manufacturing. Critics see the announcement as an effort to recruit investors into an industry whose revenues help sustain military rule. Existing gas income passes through opaque state accounts without public scrutiny or democratic oversight, and is widely believed to finance military hardware, including attack aircraft and advanced missile systems used against civilians.

The central institution is Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise, known as MOGE. The state company controls offshore production sharing contracts and joint ventures, receives much of the industry's revenue and has become a principal target of sanctions intended to restrict the military's access to money.

Block M15 Connects the Announcement to a 2015 Contract

Block M15 almost certainly forms part of the Tanintharyi announcement, although the ministry did not identify it. An estimated 94.6 trillion cubic feet was reported there last December. The block covers more than 13,000 square kilometers near Kadan Island, off the southern Tanintharyi coast in the Andaman Sea. If accurate, its estimated reserves could place it among the largest natural gas discoveries worldwide in recent decades.

Canadian Foresight Group, a company based in Singapore and led by Canadian citizen Songning Shen, won the bidding for M15 during Myanmar's political opening. It signed a production sharing contract with MOGE on March 30, 2015, under former President Thein Sein. Such a contract sets the arrangements under which a company develops a resource and shares production or proceeds with the state.

A 2017 internal company report projected that the block could generate revenue equivalent to 40 percent of Myanmar's total foreign currency earnings at that time. Using market prices then prevailing, the company valued the gas reserves at nearly $280 billion. That valuation concerns the estimated gas resource; the report's revenue comparison was tied to the economy and prices of that period.

Canadian Foresight Group maintained its interest through the country's subsequent political upheaval. Its contract predates the current junta, yet keeps it in a contractual relationship with MOGE, which is now subject to European Union and United States sanctions.

The Ministry of Electricity and Energy and the Ayeyarwady and Tanintharyi regional administrations did not respond to requests for information about the projects. Contract terms, revenue divisions and environmental assessments remain largely hidden from public view.

M15 illustrates how energy agreements signed during the period of quasi civilian government between 2011 and 2021 can survive a change of rulers. The military inherited those arrangements and has used state enterprises to consolidate power. Investors incorporated in other countries can remain involved despite growing legal and reputational risks, while Myanmar's history of resource wealth feeding corruption and conflict makes the absence of transparent oversight especially consequential.

A New Thai Venture Targets Production in 2028

MOGE signed a production sharing contract with Thailand's Gulf Petroleum Myanmar in late May 2025 for the Min Ye Thu project at Block M10 in the Mottama Gulf. It was the first agreement for offshore natural gas production since the February 2021 coup and made the project Myanmar's seventh major gas venture.

Min Ye Thu joins Yadana, Yetagun, Zawtika and Shwe, alongside two smaller operations. Gulf Petroleum Myanmar expects commercial extraction at M10 to begin in 2028. That schedule depends on the military retaining control of the institutions and territory needed to operate the project and support exports.

Gulf Petroleum Myanmar is a subsidiary of Thailand's Northern Gulf Petroleum, which has partnered with businessman Kyaw Kyaw Hlaing and his SMART Group of Companies. Described as a prominent regime crony, Kyaw Kyaw Hlaing chairs Gulf Petroleum Myanmar. SMART Group was established under an earlier military dictatorship to serve the petroleum industry controlled by the military.

Those relationships connect the new venture to a longstanding network of military business allies. The administration presents Min Ye Thu as a means of increasing foreign exchange earnings and domestic energy supplies, while critics say Myanmar's gas industry primarily serves export markets and industrial customers linked to the military.

Around 80 percent of gas from major projects is typically exported to Thailand and China. Households, meanwhile, face regular electricity shortages and rising power prices. The promise of more gas production therefore sits alongside a basic distribution problem: much of the fuel is sold abroad rather than supplied to domestic users.

Gulf Petroleum Myanmar also took over the Yetagun project in 2022 after Malaysian state oil company Petronas withdrew. Its arrival shows how the departure of a large international investor can open space for another partner willing to remain. Justice For Myanmar says Northern Gulf Petroleum likely channels payments to the regime through shell companies registered in Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands and Singapore, making revenue harder to trace.

How the Deals and Restrictions Developed

Myanmar's offshore industry combines contracts signed before the coup with new military era agreements. Sanctions, company departures and replacement investors have developed on different schedules, leaving an uneven system of restrictions.

• March 30, 2015: Canadian Foresight Group signed the Block M15 production sharing contract with MOGE under President Thein Sein.
• 2017: The company's internal report estimated the reserves' value at nearly $280 billion using prices prevailing then.
• February 2021: The military coup began the period that prompted major international energy companies to withdraw.
• June 2021: The United Kingdom sanctioned the State Administration Council, the junta's ruling body.
• Early 2022: The European Union designated MOGE. Gulf Petroleum Myanmar took over Yetagun during 2022 following Petronas's exit.
• Late 2023: The United States imposed sanctions on MOGE.
• April 2024: Justice For Myanmar submitted complaints about pipeline companies to the governors of Bermuda and the Cayman Islands.
• July 2024: The junta dissolved the State Administration Council and replaced it with the State Security and Peace Commission.
• December 2024: The US House passed the National Defense Authorization Act containing authority for presidential sanctions on MOGE.
• March 2025: Canada and Switzerland added MOGE to their sanctions lists.
• Late May 2025: MOGE and Gulf Petroleum Myanmar signed the Min Ye Thu contract, with commercial extraction expected in 2028.

Sanctions Target the Same Company in Different Ways

The European Union designated MOGE in early 2022 because it supplies substantial resources to the military, which uses them to commit atrocities against Myanmar's population. EU restrictions prohibit European companies from providing technical assistance that directly or indirectly benefits MOGE, forcing some businesses to stop operating.

The United States followed with sanctions in late 2023, and Switzerland and Canada added MOGE in March 2025. Their measures differ in scope. Washington and London have stopped short of the same comprehensive prohibitions described for the EU, leaving contractors room to continue servicing gas projects under a patchwork of national rules.

The United Kingdom sanctioned the State Administration Council in June 2021 but has not directly designated MOGE. That has created uncertainty over whether restrictions on the military's ruling body automatically cover the state energy company. The junta's July 2024 replacement of the council with the State Security and Peace Commission, run by the same generals, added another problem: the new body was not explicitly covered by existing sanctions. Justice For Myanmar called this a dangerous gap.

UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Turk has urged governments to ban arms sales to Myanmar and impose targeted sanctions, including a ban on jet fuel. At the 58th session of the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva in February 2025, he stressed that restricting energy revenue would reduce the military's capacity to commit widespread atrocities.

Sanctions work through the legal authority of the governments imposing them. A company, bank or transaction may face restrictions in one jurisdiction and different rules in another. Myanmar's gas industry spans several countries, allowing contracts, services and payments to continue where prohibitions are narrower.

Washington Faces Conflicting Energy and Diplomatic Priorities

The Biden administration faced competing pressures: restricting military revenue while protecting relations with Thailand, a major buyer of Myanmar's gas and an important US strategic partner in Southeast Asia. Concerns about disrupting Thai energy supplies complicated efforts to impose comprehensive restrictions.

The US Department of State warned that business with MOGE carries risks involving money laundering, corruption and serious human rights violations. At the same time, the Department of Commerce described oil and gas as a best prospect industry with opportunities for US investors. Those contrasting messages reflected the inconsistent policy environment surrounding the sector.

The National Defense Authorization Act passed by the US House in December 2024 included a provision authorizing the president to impose sanctions on MOGE, without requiring that action. Democratic senators including Jeff Merkley, Cory Booker and Dianne Feinstein wrote to the Treasury urging it to restrict MOGE revenue flows to help stop the junta's brutality.

The military has used corporate arrangements that place payments beyond Western regulators' reach. The narrower US approach, alongside wider EU prohibitions, has allowed parts of this financial architecture to persist. American oil service businesses have continued working in an industry about which the State Department has issued strong warnings.

Pipeline Companies Keep Money Moving Through Overseas Territories

Two pipeline operators incorporated in British overseas territories provide a detailed view of the money involved. Bermuda's Moattama Gas Transportation Company serves the Yadana field, while Andaman Transportation Limited, based in the Cayman Islands, serves Zawtika. Both operate in partnership with MOGE.

Between 2018 and early 2020, the two companies paid more than $570 million in dividends and income taxes to Myanmar's civilian government. Analysis of PTT annual reports indicates that they generated more than $754 million in pipeline fee revenue between 2021 and 2024.

MOGE holds minority stakes in both operators. Its share may have approached $239 million in pipeline fees during that period, excluding additional tax payments. Compared with the stated $754 million revenue figure, that estimate is roughly 32 percent. Pipeline fees are payments for transporting gas, creating a revenue stream alongside earnings from the gas itself.

Leaked financial statements indicate that these transport businesses kept generating substantial cash after international oil companies began withdrawing. Those foreign currency flows help sustain a regime seeking money for imports, including weapons and jet fuel.

Justice For Myanmar filed legal complaints with the governors of Bermuda and the Cayman Islands in April 2024, seeking investigations into possible sanctions breaches. Both offices acknowledged receiving them but declined to confirm whether investigations had begun.

The UK Foreign Office said the overseas territories were committed to robust sanctions enforcement. Labour peer Margaret Hodge described the situation as an outrage, while Conservative MP Andrew Mitchell said the territories had long avoided transparency reforms.

Similar corporate networks extend through the British Virgin Islands and Singapore in the Northern Gulf Petroleum business structure. Low disclosure registrations make it difficult to identify beneficiaries, follow payments and determine whether money violates sanctions. Legal experts warn that businesses with EU or US operations can face complicated exposure when they touch Myanmar gas revenues, even through nominally independent offshore entities.

Major Investors Left, but Production Continued

France's TotalEnergies, Australia's Woodside and US company Chevron withdrew from Myanmar after the coup, citing security concerns and the worsening human rights situation. TotalEnergies and Chevron left their interests in Yadana, Myanmar's largest gas asset. Chevron sold its 41.1 percent stake to Et Martem Holdings, a subsidiary of Canadian company MTI Energy.

Those departures showed that companies with substantial investments and long commitments could decide that continued association with military rule was untenable. Gas nevertheless kept flowing as other investors and service providers took their places or expanded existing roles.

South Korea's Posco International remained and continued investing hundreds of millions of dollars in Shwe. The UN Special Rapporteur on human rights identified Shwe as the regime's most profitable venture in recent years, saying it supplied more than half a billion dollars annually to the junta in the two years following the coup.

The rapporteur connected those earnings to a $1 billion arms spending spree involving fighter jets, attack helicopters and advanced missile systems. Posco defended continued operations by arguing that suspension would reduce national power generation and hurt ordinary people. The vast majority of Shwe gas, however, goes to China, while Myanmar's domestic electricity shortages have worsened sharply since 2021.

Service Contractors Earned Millions After the Coup

Leaked tax documents obtained by Distributed Denial of Secrets show that US and British oil service contractors continued earning substantial sums after the military takeover. Their drilling, maintenance and logistical work kept fields operating, helping MOGE continue collecting royalties and taxes.

Halliburton's subsidiary based in Singapore reported $6.3 million in profit before tax for the year ending in September 2021, which included eight months of junta rule. Baker Hughes reported $2.64 million in profit before tax for the six months ending in March 2022.

Diamond Offshore Drilling reported $37 million in fees to Myanmar's tax authority for the year ending in September 2021 and another $24.2 million through March 2022. Schlumberger Logelco, the subsidiary based in Panama of the world's largest offshore drilling company, earned $51.7 million in the initial period. Myanmar's energy ministry still owed it $200,000 in September 2022.

Yadanar Maung, spokesperson for Justice For Myanmar, condemned the service companies' role in sustaining the industry and warned of possible responsibility for military abuses:

Oilfield service companies in Myanmar have blood on their hands for operating in an industry that bankrolls the illegal Myanmar military junta, as it wages a campaign of terror against the people. These companies have breached their international human rights responsibilities and may be complicit in the junta's war crimes and crimes against humanity by servicing oil and gas projects that fund the junta's atrocities.

Baker Hughes said its contracts predated the coup and were completed in early 2022. Halliburton, Schlumberger and Diamond Offshore did not respond to requests for comment. Legal experts at EarthRights International warned that supporting ventures with MOGE creates a risk of complicity in war crimes, particularly for companies with an EU presence, where direct sanctions on MOGE apply.

Russia, Belarus and Thailand Shape the Energy Stakes

Coup leader General Min Aung Hlaing visited Russia and Belarus in early March 2025. It was his fourth visit to Russia since the coup and his first foreign trip after an Argentine court issued an arrest warrant for him on charges of genocide against the Rohingya.

He met Russian President Vladimir Putin and signed ten agreements, including a memorandum of understanding for a small nuclear power plant in Myanmar. The visit demonstrated Moscow's willingness to continue providing diplomatic support, military hardware and civilian nuclear technology despite the junta's international isolation.

The regime said Russia and Belarus encouraged its proposed elections in December 2025 or January 2026. Forces seeking democracy dismissed that proposed timetable as a sham intended to legitimize military rule.

The UN Special Rapporteur has documented how offshore gas earnings finance weapons purchases from Russia and China. Resource exports therefore connect directly to the junta's military relationships: gas supplies foreign currency, foreign currency buys arms, and those arms support continued repression.

Thailand occupies another central position as the main buyer of Myanmar's offshore gas and a partner in multiple pipeline companies. Bangkok has resisted cutting energy ties, complicating US sanctions policy. Myanmar can consequently pursue new production contracts while Western governments debate restrictions and overseas financial structures continue carrying revenue.

The four announced discoveries bring those competing interests together. Their estimated scale offers the military a powerful investment pitch. The distribution of existing gas, the persistence of pipeline income and the replacement of departing companies show why additional production could expand military revenue even while households face worsening electricity shortages.

The Essentials

• The military announced four offshore gas fields with an estimated combined 109 trillion cubic feet in Tanintharyi and Ayeyarwady.
• The unnamed discoveries almost certainly include Block M15, where Canadian Foresight Group signed a contract with MOGE on March 30, 2015.
• The Min Ye Thu agreement signed in late May 2025 was the first offshore production contract since the coup. Commercial extraction is expected in 2028.
• MOGE faces EU, US, Canadian and Swiss sanctions, but the scope of restrictions varies and the UK has not directly designated it.
• Two pipeline companies in Bermuda and the Cayman Islands generated more than $754 million in fees between 2021 and 2024. MOGE's share may have approached $239 million, excluding taxes.
• TotalEnergies, Woodside and Chevron withdrew, while replacement investors, Posco International and international service contractors kept parts of the industry operating.
• Around 80 percent of gas from major projects is typically exported to Thailand and China while Myanmar households endure electricity shortages.
• Gas earnings support military arms purchases, making the new discoveries a question of revenue control as well as energy development.