China Sentences Myanmar Scam Clan Leaders as Fraud Networks Move and Rebuild

Death sentences strike at Kokang's powerful families

Chinese courts in Shenzhen and Wenzhou have sentenced leading members and associates of Myanmar's Bai and Ming families to death, targeting criminal networks that turned guarded compounds into centers of online fraud. In the Bai case, judges found that the network built 41 compounds for casinos and cyber scams, generated more than 29 billion yuan in proceeds and was linked to the deaths of six Chinese citizens, another person's suicide and numerous injuries.

As of November 9, 2025, the verdicts stand among China's harshest criminal punishments in years. They form part of a wider campaign against an industry that has trapped thousands of people and stolen billions of dollars from victims in China and around the world. More than 53,000 Chinese suspects connected to compounds in northern Myanmar have been returned to China, according to officials.

The cases center on powerful families in Kokang, a Chinese speaking enclave along Myanmar's border with China. Around its principal town, Laukkaing, clans combined casinos, prostitution, armed protection and telecom fraud into a lucrative business. People recruited with promises of well paid jobs were confined and forced to deceive strangers online.

China's pressure has brought once powerful figures into court and helped secure the release of thousands of workers. The fraud industry, however, has continued to move. Operators have shifted from Kokang toward Myanmar's border with Thailand, then into other militia territories, towns and cities. Satellite internet, alternative power supplies and networks that move stolen money have helped them rebuild.

How Laukkaing became a center of fraud

The Bai, Ming, Wei and Liu families rose to prominence in the early 2000s after Myanmar's military sidelined a warlord. Connected to local militias and political power brokers, the families made arrangements with authorities and commanded fighters of their own. Their influence gave them control over businesses and the armed protection surrounding them.

Laukkaing initially drew gamblers from across the region through casinos and districts selling sexual services. Online fraud became the next major business. Teams recruited or coerced workers to carry out romance scams through social media, promote fake investments and operate illegal online gambling schemes aimed at people in China and elsewhere.

Recruiters offered jobs in technology or customer service in Southeast Asia as China's economy slowed and youth unemployment rose. Many Chinese job seekers traveled willingly, expecting legitimate employment, only to find themselves locked inside guarded compounds. Others were trafficked across borders.

Workers were trained to chat with potential victims on messaging apps, build personal trust and guide them toward fraudulent platforms. Romance and investment schemes often worked together: a supposedly affectionate online contact would introduce an opportunity to make money, then encourage progressively larger deposits.

The industry calls these operations pig butchering scams. The phrase describes how criminals cultivate a person's confidence, sometimes showing small early gains, before taking their money. The friendship, the investment returns and the trading platform can all be parts of the same deception.

Violence kept workers inside the compounds

Guarded gates and clan militias made escape dangerous. Workers described beatings, electric shocks and starvation when they failed to meet revenue quotas. Armed protection also helped keep local authorities away from the businesses.

The Bai network's 41 compounds show the scale of the operation described in court. Casinos and cyber fraud businesses generated more than 29 billion yuan in proceeds, while violence associated with the network caused deaths and injuries. Behind the computer screens were people whose movements and working lives were controlled by force.

Survivors from across Asia and Africa described being recruited through false promises, deceived at airports or sold across borders into compounds. Once inside, many worked long shifts on phones and computers under supervisors who demanded daily revenue targets.

Families sometimes received ransom demands from intermediaries claiming they could purchase a relative's release. This created another way to extract money: a worker's family could be pressured to pay while the worker was being forced to steal from strangers.

Hundreds of thousands of people are believed to be working in scam centers globally, many under coercion or trafficking conditions. Within Myanmar, the combination of armed guards, confinement and punishment made these businesses much more than ordinary fraudulent offices.

What the Shenzhen court decided

In Shenzhen, five men received death sentences in the Bai family case: Bai Suocheng, a longtime Kokang power broker; his son, Bai Yingcang; Yang Liqiang; Hu Xiaojiang; and Chen Guangyi. Their convictions formed part of proceedings involving fraud, homicide, injury, illegal detention and other crimes connected to the Myanmar compounds.

Two other defendants received death sentences suspended for two years. That punishment can later be commuted. Five defendants received life imprisonment, while nine were sentenced to prison terms ranging from three to 20 years.

The court described widespread abuse within the network's facilities. Its findings tied the operation to six Chinese citizens' deaths, another person's suicide and many injuries, alongside the proceeds from casinos and cyber fraud.

Bai Yingcang was also found to have conspired to traffic and manufacture 11 tonnes of methamphetamine. That finding showed how the same criminal network reached beyond online scams into the drug trade. The compounds existed within a broader economy of illegal businesses protected by force.

Chinese authorities presented the verdicts as a warning to syndicates targeting Chinese citizens. Their message was that crimes committed outside China's borders could still bring severe punishment in Chinese courts.

The Ming clan's sentences in Wenzhou

The court in Wenzhou sentenced 11 members and associates of the Ming clan to death. Five more received death sentences suspended for two years, and a further 12 defendants received prison terms ranging from five to 24 years.

Judges said the group ran compounds protected by armed men and used violence to control workers. The case included multiple killings, including the deaths of people who tried to flee.

The Ming clan had long been connected to Crouching Tiger Villa, a notorious compound. At its peak, the clan employed as many as 10,000 people across scams, gambling, drug trafficking and organized prostitution. Its patriarch, Ming Xuechang, died while in custody, according to officials.

The Shenzhen and Wenzhou judgments targeted senior figures in two of Kokang's dominant families. Taken together, the cases addressed both the fraud directed at people outside Myanmar and the physical violence used against people inside the compounds.

China expands arrests, rescues and returns

China's campaign has combined criminal trials with pressure along its southern frontier. Police issued wanted notices offering rewards for clan leaders, while authorities pressed Myanmar to hand over suspects. Officials say more than 53,000 Chinese suspects linked to compounds in northern Myanmar have been returned to China.

Flights also brought groups of repatriated Chinese citizens home from border hubs. The first planes carried around 600 people. Returning people across borders required coordination among security agencies, transport authorities and the governments controlling the routes out.

The campaign extended to the Thailand Myanmar border, where Chinese, Thai and Myanmar agencies conducted joint actions around notorious business estates near Myawaddy. Officials said more than 7,000 workers were freed in one wave. Subsequent operations brought the total higher.

Authorities described the mid 2020s as a period of intensive operations. China also launched a multinational program known in Chinese as Jingyao with Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam. Officials reported more than 70,000 arrests across the region and the rescue of 160 victims in its first phase, many of them taken from northern Myanmar.

The figures cover different parts of the campaign: suspects returned from northern Myanmar, workers released near Myawaddy, and arrests and rescues across several countries under Jingyao. Each describes a different measure of police activity.

Senior Chinese security officials met their counterparts in Bangkok to coordinate repatriations and border controls. China's Ministry of Public Security publicly promised to rescue trafficked people and pursue compound bosses. Beijing also recognized Myanmar officials for their cooperation.

Diplomatic pressure meets a fragmented Myanmar

Foreign Minister Wang Yi, China's top diplomat, pressed for a regional response at a meeting with Southeast Asian envoys. He urged neighboring governments to act against online gambling and telecom fraud along the Thailand Myanmar border and beyond, describing the danger to Chinese citizens.

We urge regional partners to take decisive action against online gambling and telecom fraud that endanger our citizens.

A senior Chinese investigator also addressed the purpose of the campaign during a briefing, warning people involved in scams targeting China.

Anyone who commits these crimes against Chinese people will pay the price.

Myanmar's civil war after the 2021 coup created room for armed groups and criminal investors to expand. Control of border regions is fragmented, and law enforcement is weak. Local militias make money from protection fees, land concessions and kickbacks, giving them financial reasons to shelter profitable businesses.

Job seekers in China and elsewhere in Asia supplied a stream of potential recruits, drawn by promises of high wages. Digital payments and platforms operating offshore allowed money to move quickly. Criminal businesses could reach victims abroad while keeping their physical operations in places where police had limited access.

The industry's development and relocation followed several broad stages:

• In the early 2000s, the Bai, Ming, Wei and Liu families rose in Kokang after Myanmar's military sidelined a warlord.
• After the 2021 coup, civil war and fragmented authority created more space for armed groups and criminal investors.
• In late 2023, armed groups and Chinese pressure disrupted Kokang operations, prompting many syndicates to move south.
• During the mid 2020s, intensive regional operations combined arrests, rescues and repatriations with pressure on border compounds.

Operators move from Kokang into new territories

Many syndicates leaving Kokang in late 2023 shifted toward Myawaddy and the frontier estates of KK Park and Shwe Kokko. Raids and expulsions there then pushed leaders and managers into a patchwork of other towns and militia zones, or farther inside Myanmar.

Security sources and civil society groups in Myanmar described another wave of relocation into southern and eastern Shan State and major cities, including Yangon and Mandalay. Some operators crossed into Thailand. Others remained in Myanmar and rebuilt their businesses.

Accounts from the ground described equipment being removed from closed zones while new offices opened elsewhere. Moving computers, communications equipment and managers allowed operators to establish replacement sites after a compound was shut.

Governments have identified the Karen Border Guard Force and the Democratic Karen Benevolent Army as facilitators or protectors of some scam hubs. The Border Guard Force has rejected accusations of involvement in trafficking and says it has cooperated in rescues.

In Shan State, townships experiencing an influx of operators and recruits included Kunhing, Mongpan, Mong Hsu, Mongyai, Laihka, Tangyan, Namhsan, Mongnawng and Mongping. Travelers described passing checkpoints through bribes, while villages rented homes and sold food to newcomers.

Those local transactions made the industry part of the economy in some places. A scam operation could pay for protection, rent property and buy supplies while conducting its fraud elsewhere through the internet. That spread of income and influence made enforcement harder.

How the scams reach victims abroad

Romance investment schemes remain a mainstay of the business. A victim meets a friendly person online and is introduced to a trading app showing early gains. The apparent success encourages more deposits. Later, the platform blocks withdrawals.

Workers follow detailed scripts and adopt false identities to make the conversations convincing. Money is directed into accounts or digital wallets controlled by the syndicates. The person appearing to offer friendship may themselves be under coercion inside a compound.

Other teams operate fake brokerage desks, carry out phishing attacks or use business email compromise. Phishing tricks people into revealing sensitive information or following deceptive instructions. Business email compromise involves impersonating a company executive or another trusted business contact to redirect payments.

The range of methods allows the networks to target both individuals and businesses. Some schemes depend on a relationship built over time; others rely on a message that appears to come from someone with authority over a payment.

Police forces in many countries say losses reach tens of billions of dollars each year. In the United States alone, losses from investment and romance fraud connected to these networks have been estimated at around $10 billion a year.

Technology and money help compounds keep operating

Operators have adapted when authorities cut electricity, internet connections or fuel. Solar panels provide another source of power, while satellite links can keep computers connected without relying on local internet infrastructure.

Starlink terminals provide fast connections even in remote valleys in parts of Myanmar. The service is not licensed in Myanmar, yet dishes are common around the Thailand Myanmar frontier. United States agencies have warned the provider about misuse, and lawmakers have asked how equipment reached restricted areas.

Stolen money travels through traditional bank transfers, cryptocurrency tokens and networks of money launderers. Laundering moves criminal proceeds through transactions intended to hide their origin, making it harder to trace the money back to the fraud.

Analysts tracking financial flows in Southeast Asia say criminal groups use stablecoins, mixers and chains of mule accounts. Stablecoins are cryptocurrency tokens designed to keep a steady value. Mixers combine digital transactions to obscure their paths, while mule accounts pass money through a series of accounts held or controlled by intermediaries.

These methods help groups move funds quickly and conceal their routes. Criminal teams also test artificial intelligence to produce convincing messages and contact more people, adding another tool to operations already organized around scripts and false identities.

The combination of alternative power, satellite communications and flexible payment channels gives operators several ways to continue after a disruption. Closing a location can interrupt the work there, while the people, equipment and financial network may move elsewhere.

What the campaign has achieved and what remains difficult

The arrests of clan leaders, severe court sentences and transfers of suspects from northern Myanmar demonstrate the reach of coordinated pressure. Cutting utilities and policing borders have helped free thousands of people. Joint operations and chartered flights have brought Chinese nationals home.

Public warnings have also influenced potential recruits. A hit movie about a young couple trapped in a Southeast Asian scam park helped reduce risky travel among some people considering overseas job offers.

Criminal bosses continue to relocate, recruit local armed groups and bribe officials. New compounds appear deeper inside conflict zones, beyond the easy reach of reporters and foreign consulates. People from countries with fewer resources to intervene continue to become victims.

The continuing challenge spans police investigations, financial regulation, technology platforms and border controls. Arresting leaders addresses the people directing particular networks; tracing payments, disrupting communications and protecting recruits addresses the means by which replacement operations grow.

By November 9, 2025, Beijing had secured major convictions and coordinated large operations with regional governments. The extent of the industry's continuing relocation showed why those gains required sustained cooperation: the networks were responding to pressure by changing where and how they worked.

What to Know

• Shenzhen sentenced five Bai network figures to death; Wenzhou sentenced 11 Ming clan members and associates to death. Other defendants received suspended death sentences, life imprisonment or prison terms.
• The Bai network built 41 compounds and generated more than 29 billion yuan in casino and cyber fraud proceeds. Its violence was linked to six Chinese citizens' deaths, another person's suicide and many injuries.
• Bai Yingcang was found to have conspired to traffic and manufacture 11 tonnes of methamphetamine.
• Officials say more than 53,000 Chinese suspects connected to northern Myanmar compounds have been returned to China.
• One wave of joint operations near Myawaddy freed more than 7,000 workers, with later operations increasing the total.
• The first phase of Jingyao produced more than 70,000 arrests across the region and rescued 160 victims, according to officials.
• Operators moved from Kokang toward KK Park and Shwe Kokko, then into other parts of Myanmar, including Shan State, Yangon and Mandalay. Some crossed into Thailand.
• Governments identified the Karen Border Guard Force and Democratic Karen Benevolent Army as protectors or facilitators of some hubs. The Border Guard Force denies involvement in trafficking.
• Many compound workers face coercion, confinement and violence. Hundreds of thousands of people are believed to work in scam centers globally.
• Satellite internet, solar power and financial networks help operations continue. Related investment and romance fraud losses in the United States have been estimated at around $10 billion a year.