Li Sichuan Challenges New Taipei Poll Showing Su Chiao Hui Ahead by 13.1 Points

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Li Sichuan Challenges New Taipei Poll Showing Su Chiao Hui Ahead by 13.1 Points

A widening lead meets a challenge over the sample

A survey of 1,073 New Taipei residents released on October 13, 2026, put Democratic Progressive Party candidate Su Chiao Hui at 43.1% support and Kuomintang candidate Li Sichuan at 30.0%. The 13.1 percentage point gap marks a sharp departure from the narrow margins recorded in earlier surveys, but Li's campaign says the sample does not reflect the city's political balance.

Contents
  1. A widening lead meets a challenge over the sample
  2. What the October survey measured
  3. How the race moved from March to October
  4. Why Li's campaign questions the result
  5. Other polls show a different contest
  6. Turnout intentions give Su a larger lead
  7. Party loyalties and the uncommitted vote
  8. Suitability and support for a change in government
  9. The projected vote is closer than the headline
  10. The candidates turn back to development plans
  11. Key Points

The dispute centers on the proportion of respondents identifying with each major party. Li's campaign said Democratic Progressive Party supporters outnumbered Kuomintang supporters by 1.6 to one in the survey, even though the two parties received nearly equal shares of New Taipei's party list vote in the 2024 national election. That comparison is the campaign's argument for questioning the results, rather than an independently established finding that the poll is biased.

The Taipei Trust and Cross Strait Research Association commissioned the survey, with questionnaire design and analysis by pollster Tai Li An and telephone interviews conducted by Beacon Market Research. Interviews took place from October 6 through October 8 among registered New Taipei residents aged 20 or older.

The result is also at odds with another recent survey commissioned by the Kuomintang caucus in the New Taipei City Council, which put Li ahead by 6.7 points. A separate poll commissioned by the council's Democratic Progressive Party caucus showed Su ahead by 4.6 points.

Those competing results make this more than a dispute over one headline number. The surveys point in different directions, while the association's own estimate of an election held immediately suggests a considerably smaller advantage for Su than its raw support figures do.

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What the October survey measured

Beyond the two leading candidates, the association's survey recorded 1.5% support for independent Su Hui Huang. Another 9.5% said they would not vote or would cast an invalid ballot, while 15.8% gave no clear answer. Together, those last two groups account for 25.3% of respondents, a substantial share outside the stated support for any candidate.

The survey completed 750 interviews through residential telephones and 323 through mobile phones. Those figures represent approximately 69.9% and 30.1% of the completed interviews respectively. Its stated maximum sampling error was plus or minus three percentage points at a 95% confidence level.

A sampling error describes the uncertainty associated with drawing a sample rather than interviewing an entire population. It does not, by itself, account for every possible source of error, such as whether some groups were harder to reach, declined interviews more often or answered questions differently.

The published account does not establish the detailed weighting procedure, response rate or full party identification breakdown. Those details matter to assessing the campaign's complaint. The total number of interviews and the telephone mix alone cannot establish whether the political composition was representative.

How the race moved from March to October

The association's series had previously shown a close contest. Li led by 1.1 percentage points in March and one point in April. By late August, Su held a 0.5 point advantage, with neither candidate far ahead.

The sequence of survey results and releases shows how abruptly the picture changed:

  • March: Li received 39.1% support and Su 38.0%, a 1.1 point lead for Li.
  • April: Li stood at 35.5% and Su at 34.5%, a one point lead for Li.
  • Late August, released September 1: Su received 35.2% and Li 34.7%, a 0.5 point lead for Su.
  • October 2: A poll commissioned by the Democratic Progressive Party council caucus put Su at 39.1% and Li at 34.5%.
  • October 7: A poll commissioned by the Kuomintang council caucus put Li at 42.6% and Su at 35.9%.
  • October 6 to 8, released October 13: The association's latest survey put Su at 43.1% and Li at 30.0%.

Within the association's series, Su gained 7.9 points from August while Li lost 4.7 points. Their combined movement widened Su's advantage by 12.6 points. That arithmetic explains the change in the reported margin, but does not establish why respondents changed their preferences or whether differences in the samples contributed.

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Why Li's campaign questions the result

Li's campaign argues that the survey's party composition is too heavily tilted toward the Democratic Progressive Party. It pointed to the claimed 1.6 to one ratio of Democratic Progressive Party supporters to Kuomintang supporters and contrasted it with the nearly even division of the two parties' 2024 party list vote in New Taipei.

The distinction between those measures is important. A party list vote records an actual ballot choice at a particular election. Party identification in a later poll records how respondents describe their political affiliation when interviewed. Voters can change preferences, identify with no party or support a candidate from another party. The two measures therefore need not match exactly.

That does not dismiss the campaign's concern. If supporters of one party were more likely to answer the survey, or were not adequately accounted for during weighting, the final result could be affected. Establishing that would require more information than the ratio cited by the campaign.

The campaign said it respected polls that could withstand scrutiny and would continue seeking support through policy proposals and visits across New Taipei's 29 districts. It also cited the survey commissioned by the Kuomintang council caucus as evidence of a different electoral picture.

Other polls show a different contest

The three October surveys do not merely differ in the size of a lead. They disagree about who leads. The Democratic Progressive Party council caucus commissioned a survey conducted by Shanshui that showed Su ahead by 4.6 points. The Kuomintang council caucus commissioned another telephone survey that showed Li ahead by 6.7 points. The association's poll showed Su ahead by 13.1 points.

Expressed consistently as Su's margin over Li, those results range from minus 6.7 points to plus 13.1 points, a spread of 19.8 points. Su's support ranges from 35.9% to 43.1%, while Li's ranges from 30.0% to 42.6%.

The commissioning bodies should be identified because two of the polls were ordered by political caucuses competing in the election. Sponsorship alone does not prove a poll is inaccurate. Question wording, interview dates, sampling, weighting and treatment of undecided respondents are also needed for a meaningful comparison.

Release dates should not be mistaken for interview dates. The association's fieldwork ran from October 6 to October 8, overlapping the October 7 release of the Kuomintang caucus survey. Without comparable fieldwork details for all three, their publication sequence cannot reliably be read as a daily trend.

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Turnout intentions give Su a larger lead

The association's poll found that 82.4% of respondents said they would definitely or probably vote. That included 65.1% who said they would definitely vote and 17.3% who said they probably would. Another 12.2% said they definitely or probably would not vote, and 5.4% gave no clear answer.

Among respondents saying they would definitely vote, Su received 55.1% support and Li 35.9%, a 19.2 point gap. This is a different measure from support among all respondents and should not be treated as the same result.

There was also a difference between the candidates' supporters: 83.3% of Su supporters said they would definitely vote, compared with 78.0% of Li supporters. The gap was 5.3 points. Among people expecting Su to win, 81.1% expressed a definite intention to vote, compared with 74.0% among those expecting Li to win.

These responses measure declared intention, not actual turnout. They suggest greater expressed voting commitment among Su's supporters in this survey, but they do not establish how many people will ultimately cast ballots.

Party loyalties and the uncommitted vote

The survey's breakdown showed about nine in ten respondents in the broader Kuomintang and Democratic Progressive Party camps supporting their respective candidates. Among Taiwan People's Party supporters, 64.9% backed Li and 13.4% backed Su. One account rounded Li's figure to 65%; that is a rounding difference rather than a conflicting result.

Among respondents classified as politically neutral, Su received 23.7% support and Li 15.8%, a 7.9 point advantage for Su. Yet 35.9% gave no clear answer, and 21.3% said they would not vote or would cast an invalid ballot. Those two categories together represented 57.2% of the neutral group.

Tai, who designed and analyzed the survey, suggested that greater willingness among Democratic Progressive Party supporters to state their views could be accompanied by a spiral of silence among Kuomintang or Taiwan People's Party supporters. The term describes a situation in which people become less willing to express a view they believe is unpopular.

That explanation is an interpretation, not proof of how respondents behaved. It also touches the central dispute: a difference in expressed party identification could reflect political change, willingness to answer or features of the sample. The published figures do not isolate those possibilities.

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Suitability and support for a change in government

The association also asked whether the candidates were suitable to serve as mayor. Su was considered suitable by 48.6% and unsuitable by 22.3%. Li was considered suitable by 35.9% and unsuitable by 33.5%. Su's advantage on suitability was 12.7 points, close to her 13.1 point lead on voting preference.

Compared with August, Su's suitability rating rose 4.8 points and her unsuitable rating fell 3.1 points. Li's suitability rating fell 4.7 points, while his unsuitable rating rose 6.5 points. These are separate judgments from voting intention: someone can regard a candidate as suitable without choosing that candidate.

Asked about party control of the mayoralty, 44.2% favored giving the Democratic Progressive Party a turn, while 27.9% favored keeping a Kuomintang mayor. Among definite voters, the figures were 52.9% and 32.3% respectively.

The association's presentation also cited satisfaction above 70% with incumbent Mayor Hou You Yi. Taken together, the results suggest that approval of an incumbent's performance and preference for his party's successor are not necessarily the same thing.

Association founder Huang Ching Lung and Tai connected the movement to political developments in neighboring Taipei, describing a spillover effect and suggesting Taipei Mayor Chiang Wan An had weighed on Li's support. Their explanation was not established by the survey comparisons alone. Reports differ over which of the two men delivered some of the detailed descriptions, although both were associated with that interpretation.

The projected vote is closer than the headline

The association estimated that, if voting took place immediately, Su would receive between 50.1% and 53.1% of the vote, while Li would receive between 46.0% and 48.9%. It described Su's projected advantage as about 4.1 percentage points, plus or minus three points.

That projection is distinct from the raw support result of 43.1% against 30.0%, and from the 55.1% against 35.9% result among definite voters. Each uses a different basis. Treating them interchangeably would give readers an inaccurate impression of what the survey predicts.

The published account does not explain the full calculation behind the projected vote shares, including how undecided respondents and turnout assumptions were handled. Without that method, the projection cannot be independently reconstructed from the headline figures. Its narrower margin nevertheless shows why a 13.1 point survey lead should not be presented as a forecast of the final winning margin.

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The candidates turn back to development plans

Su responded to the polling dispute while campaigning at Minzhi Market in Yonghe on October 13. She said she took the various polls seriously and acknowledged that the Kuomintang's survey still showed room for improvement. In an English translation of her remarks, the Democratic Progressive Party candidate said:

I will work until I lead even in the Kuomintang's polls.

Li, campaigning in Shulin that day, said he remained confident and would take polling into account. He said visits across New Taipei's 29 districts had given him a sense of support. In an English translation of his remarks, the Kuomintang candidate said:

Public opinion is definitely more important than opinion polls.

The candidates also set out competing development priorities. Su said the proposed Danhai Science City originated in a policy proposal by Lai Ching Te in 2023, had undergone two public exhibitions and remained under planning. She said she wanted investment, talent, artificial intelligence businesses and their supply chains to stay in New Taipei.

Responding to criticism about transport arrangements, Su contrasted that plan with relocating Songshan Airport. She argued that relocation would affect 5.6 million passenger journeys and complicate medical travel and transfers for residents of offshore islands. The passenger figure was part of her argument, without a specified reporting period.

Li said he would replan the second and third phases of Danhai New Town to attract technology industries and create local jobs, rather than leaving the area primarily residential and commercial. In Shulin, he promised to complete a New Taipei dome within eight years and pursue railway undergrounding, linking the venue to baseball, concerts and local economic activity.

No full polling disclosure resolving the sample dispute or dated next release was identified. The development proposals likewise do not establish completed approvals or funding arrangements. For now, the contest combines contradictory polling signals with policy promises voters must assess separately.

Key Points

  • The October 13 association poll put Su at 43.1% and Li at 30.0%, a 13.1 point gap.
  • Li's campaign challenged the reported party composition, citing a 1.6 to one ratio favoring Democratic Progressive Party supporters.
  • Other October polls showed Su ahead by 4.6 points or Li ahead by 6.7 points.
  • The association interviewed 1,073 residents from October 6 to October 8 and reported a maximum sampling error of three percentage points.
  • Its projected election result gave Su a narrower advantage of about 4.1 points, using a calculation not fully explained in the published account.
  • Both candidates continued campaigning and presented plans for technology investment, transport and development in New Taipei.
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